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Abstract
According to conventional wisdom, presentism is at odds with the theory of relativity. This is supposed to
be shown quite simply just by considering the relativity of simultaneity. In this paper I will show that
conventional wisdom is wrong. In fact by clarifying the physical meaning of the relativity of simultaneity
one can inform the philosophical debate and endorse a presentist view.
1 Introduction
There is in the philosophical debate around the conception of time in the 1905 theory of
relativity  different  levels.  There  is  one  important  debate  regarding  to  what  point
philosophy of time might or might not be informed by the theory of relativity (or other
physical theories); one clear example of this being the presentism/eternalism debate and
to what point physical theories can guide/help settle issues within the debate (see, e.g.,
Hawley 2006). 
At  another  level  of  the  debate  it  is  usually  accepted  implicitly  the relevance  of
scientific conceptions for an informed philosophy of time (see, e.g., Mozersky 2000,
Arthur 2006). This is particularly clear in the case of the presentism/eternalism debate in
which  the  relativity  of  simultaneity  is  taken  by a  majority  of  authors  to  show that
presentism is not an option when one accepts a philosophically informed view taking
into account the theory of relativity (see, e.g., Savitt 2000, Saunders 2002). It is at this
level that this work is developed. The work is presented as follows.
In section 2 I will address what has been considered since its inception an important
factor  for  changing  from  the  previous  notions  of  time:  the  so-called  relativity  of
simultaneity. Also I will address one example of a philosophical view informed by the
theory of relativity, consisting in a criticism of presentism (Petkov 2009).
In  section  3  I  will  provide  a  clarification  of  the  relativity  of  simultaneity  by
recovering Einstein early insights, and making clear their meaning. This will enable to
see  that  the  relativity  of  simultaneity  is  simply  a  relativity  (i.e.  dependence  on  the
reference frame) of the synchronization of distant clocks.
In section 4 I will return to the criticism of presentism presented in section 2 and,
using the results from section 3, show that it is based on a wrong interpretation of the
relativity  of  simultaneity.  In  this  way,  I  will  make  the  case  that  the  relativity  of
simultaneity is compatible with presentism.
2 The relativity of simultaneity and an example of a related informed philosophical
view
Einstein identified the relativity of simultaneity as the most important consequence of
the theory of relativity (Einstein 1914, 4), even referring to it as the relativity of time
(Einstein 1915, 254).
Let us follow Einstein’s account leading to the so-called relativity of simultaneity.
First  of  all  the  time  at  a  particular  location  (within  a  reference  frame)  is
measured/defined by a clock located in the immediate vicinity (Einstein 1907, 255). By
a clock one understands a closed physical system that undergoes a recurrent process
(Einstein 1912-1914, 29; Einstein 1915, 252-3). According to Einstein, “by means of
the  determination  of  this  clock,  every  event  that  is  spatially  infinitely  close  to  the
[clock] can be assigned a temporal determination, the “time coordinate,” or, in brief, the
“time” of the event” (Einstein 1912-1914, 29). It is important to notice that “only the
times of events  occurring in the immediate  vicinity  of the clock can be ascertained
directly by means of the clock” (Einstein 1915, 253). This means that at this moment
one only has a notion of ‘time’ in the vicinity of the chosen clock. To go beyond this
point one must consider a set of identical clocks that we can imagine to be located at
different places of a rigid measuring framework, i.e. constituting with rods an inertial
reference  frame that  enables  to measured  length and time intervals.  In this  way “to
determine time at each point in space we can imagine it populated with a very great
number of clocks of identical construction” (Einstein 1910, 125). At this point one can
associate to each location a ‘time coordinate’, but these are unrelated. As Einstein called
the attention to, “the totality of these clock readings does not yet give us the “time” as
we need it for physical purpose” (Einstein 1907, 256). According to Einstein “to get a
complete physical definition of time, we have to take an additional step. We have to say
in what manner all of the clocks have been set at the start of the experiment” (Einstein
1910, 126). This can be achieved by synchronizing the clocks of the reference frame in
a way that we can say that the different clocks are in phase; in simple terms, the hands
of the clocks are made to be all pointing to the same time reading, and since they are
identical clocks they run at the same pace, in this way maintaining the same phase. In
this way we arrive at what Einstein calls the physical definition of time: “the totality of
the readings of all clocks in phase with one another is what we will call the physical
time” (Einstein 1910, 127).
This notion/definition of time is made in relation to a particular reference frame
where identical clocks are synchronized. This means that “a statement on time has a
meaning only with reference to a reference system” (Einstein 1907, 257).
The point now is what to make of a particular statement on time made in reference
to a particular reference frame S from the perspective of another reference frame S’ in
relative motion.  It is here that we start to address questions related to the notion of
simultaneity. Let us consider the statement on time {stat} = {two spatially distant point
events  are  simultaneous  with  respect  to  a  reference  frame  S}.  We  know  that  in
Newtonian mechanics this statement is valid for all inertial reference frames (see, e.g.,
Torretti 1996, 28); but is this the case in the theory of relativity? Let us follow Einstein
on this issue:
Consider  two  nonaccelerated  coordinate  systems  S  and  S’  in  uniform
translational  motion with respect to  one another.  Suppose that each of these
systems is provided with a group of clocks invariably attached to it, and that all
the clocks belonging to the same system are in phase. Under these conditions
the readings of the group attached to S will define the physical time with respect
to S; analogously, the readings of the group attached to S’ define the physical
time with respect to S’. Each elementary event will have a time coordinate t
with respect to S, and a time coordinate t’ with respect to S’. But, we have no
right to assume a priori that the clocks of the two groups can be set in such a
manner that  the two time coordinates  of the elementary event  would be the
same, or in other words, in such a way that t would be equal to t’.  (Einstein
1910, 128)
In fact, since the physical definition of time is particular to each reference frame it will
turn  out  that  the  previous  statement  on  time  {stat}  is  not  valid  in  all  the  inertial
reference frames in relative motion. We can see this easily by considering the Lorentz
transformation that relates space and time determinations made in two reference frames
in relative  motion  (Einstein  1915, 256; Stephenson and Kilmister  1958, 37).  Let  us
consider two events with coordinates (t1, x1) and (t2, x2) in the reference frame S, and
coordinates (t1’, x1’) and (t2’, x2’) in the reference frame S’. According to the Lorentz
transformation t1’– t2’ = β[t1  – t2 – v(x1  – x2)/c2], where β = 1/ sqrt (1 – v2/c2), c is the
velocity of light in vacuum, and v is the relative velocity between S and S’. In the
particular  case  of  two  events  that  in  S  are  simultaneous  but  occurring  at  different
locations we have t1 = t2 and x1 ≠ x2, and so t1’– t2’ = βv(x1  – x2)/c2, i.e. in S’ the two
events  are not  simultaneous.  In this  reference frame it  is  considered to exist  a time
interval between the two events.
It  is  possible  to  give  a  less  mathematical  presentation  of  the  relativity  of
simultaneity (see, e.g., Einstein 1916, 274-6; Bergmann 1942, 30-2). Let us imagine a
train in relative motion in relation to an embankment and that two thunderbolts strike
simultaneously with reference to the embankment, leaving permanent marks on a train
and on the embankment (see figure 1). The light from the thunderbolts is reflected and
directed towards two observers (one on the train, the other on the embankment) located
midway between the marks, at M’ and M. The light beams arrive at the same time at M.
however M’ is in relative motion. When the thunderbolts strike, M’ coincides with M
but it is moving with the train with a velocity v. In this way, an observer locate at M’ is 
hastening towards the beam of light coming from B, whilst he is riding on ahead
of the beam of light coming from A. Hence the observer will see the beam of
light emitted from B earlier than he will see that emitted from A. Observers who
take  the  railway  train  as  their  reference-body  must  therefore  come  to  the
conclusion that the lightning flash B took place earlier than the lightning flash
A. (Einstein 1916, 275)
We arrive then at the so-called relativity of simultaneity: two events (in this case the
two  thunderbolts  striking)  are  taken  to  be  simultaneous  in  a  reference  frame  (the
embankment),  while  in  another  reference  frame  (the  train)  are  taken  not  to  be
simultaneous. 
Figure 1
This result is regarded as quite important on physically informed philosophical views on
time.  In fact, some consider the relativity of simultaneity a decisive element against
presentist views and in agreement with eternalist views (see, e.g. Petkov 2006; Peterson
and Silberstein 2010). I will focus just on one exemplifying argument made by Petkov
(2009).1
1 In  this work I will only consider Petkov views related to the relativity of simultaneity presented in
Petkov (2009).
By considering the relativity of simultaneity Petkov makes the case that the only
way  in  which  presentism  can  accommodate  the  relativity  of  simultaneity  is  by
relativizing  what  he calls  the three-dimensional  (3D) world.  For  an eternalist  (four-
dimensionalist) a 3D object is just a slice of a four-dimensional (4D) worldline of a
timelessly existing 4D world (or block universe) in which all the slices (i.e.  the 3D
objects) are actually all given at once.  For a presentist, the 3D world consists of all 3D
objects and fields existing simultaneously at the moment ‘now’ or ‘present’.  In this
view there is a clear differentiation between past, present and future. The past consists
in the previous states of the 3D world. What we call the future refers to the expected
forthcoming states. In this way “the past and the future do not exist on the presentist
view  -  they  are  merely  states  of  the  3D  world  which  exists  solely  at  the  present
moment”  (Petkov 2009, 126).
To make his case Petkov considers two observers A and B in relative motion. We
can regard the observers to be located at the origin of two inertial reference frames. Let
us consider two clocks C1 and C2 from A’s reference frame (at the locations –d and + d).
Figure 2 gives a schematic representation of the clocks’ worldlines and the planes of
simultaneity for A and B. 
Figure 2
As it is usually done, we consider that A and B meet at an event M (i.e. that there is a
moment in which the origins of the reference frames coincide) and that they set the
clocks to tA = tB = 5. To Petkov, for a presentist it only makes sense to consider that the
clocks exist only at the moment ‘now’ of their proper time. Accordingly, “to observer
A, both clocks exist at the 5th second of the coordinate time measured in A’s reference
frame” (Petkov 2009, 129); in this way “A comes to the conclusion that C1 and C2 both
exist at the 5th second of their proper times” (Petkov 2009, 129). For Petkov this result
is to be expected since, for presentists, all objects share the same ‘now’.
The problem facing presentism is that, “what is simultaneous for A, however, is not
simultaneous for B” (Petkov 2009, 129). When considering B’s plane of simultaneity
we see that 
what is simultaneous for B at the 5th second of B’s time (when B meets A at M)
is clock C1 existing at the 8th second of its proper time and clock C2 existing at
the 2th second of its proper time. Therefore, for B the moment ‘now’ of the
proper time of C1 is the 8th second, whereas the present moment of C2 is the 2th
second of its proper time. (Petkov 2009, 129)
According to Petkov interpretation of the relativity of simultaneity “when A and B meet
at M, they will disagree on which is the present moment of each of the clocks and on
what exists for them at the moment of meeting” (Petkov 2009, 129). Petkov concludes
that the “relativity of simultaneity is possible in the framework of the presentist view if
different pairs of clocks exist for A and B at M” (Petkov 2009, 129), i.e. the presentist
must regard the existence of the 3D clocks as relative (observer- or frame-dependent). If
this was the case, one should endorse Petkov view that 
the concept of existence employed by a relativized version of presentism is so
twisted that Nature is unlikely to be impressed by this pushing of the human
imagination to such an extreme that allows observer A to claim that C1 at its 8th
second does not exist for him but exists for B … This shows why the price
presentism should pay to avoid a contradiction with relativity is an ontological
relativization of existence. (Petkov 2009, 130-1)
I will postpone a critical evaluation of Petkov views until I make a clarification of the
so-called relativity of simultaneity.  However, this example shows that, if one accepts
that our philosophical views on time should be in agreement with what one considers to
be the content/consequences of our physical theories, physically informed arguments
can be quite elaborated and consistent with the adopted interpretations.2 
 
3 The relativity of simultaneity as (just) a relativity of synchronization of distant clocks
Petkov  interpretation  of  the  relativity  of  simultaneity  goes  well  beyond  Einstein’s
presentation.  Returning  to  Einstein’s  example  of  a  train  in  motion  relative  to  an
embankment, Einstein mentions that
Events  which  are  simultaneous  with  reference  to  the  embankment  are  not
simultaneous with respect to the train, and vice versa (relativity of simultaneity).
Every reference-body (co-ordinate system) has its own particular time; unless
we are told the reference-body to which the statement of time refers, there is no
meaning in a statement of the time of an event.  (Einstein 1916, 275-6)
It is important to have in mind that Einstein arrives at these views not from a vague and
intuitive notion of time, but by following a very defined narrative in which he gives a
definition of physical time; and the so-called relativity of simultaneity is revealed by
statements on time related to this narrative. In a nutshell we have: (1) identical clocks;
(2)  the  ‘distribution’  of  the  clocks  to  make  a  space-time  reference  frame;  (3)  the
synchronization of the clocks in the particular reference frame; (4) the adoption of the
same procedure for all other inertial reference frames that are in relative motion or rest
between all of them.
By following steps 1 to 3 one defines physical time in a particular reference frame;
by applying 4 one defines physical time in other reference frames. Einstein’s views on
time are views on the physical time defined in this way.
By following Einstein’s own account I will now show that by giving a closer look at
the  step  3,  i.e.  by  analysing  the  synchronization  procedure,  one  arrives  at  an
2 This does not mean that it is not possible to present philosophical arguments that ‘resist’ scientifically
informed views (see, e.g., Dorato 2006) 
interpretation  of  the so-called  relativity  of  simultaneity  quite  different  from the  one
being made by Petkov.
By taking the velocity of light to be isotropic, i.e. not dependent on any direction,
Einstein  considers  that  two clocks  located  at  A and B are  synchronous  if  the  time
intervals (measured using the identical clocks A and B) that light takes to go from A to
B and from B to A are equal: “suppose a ray of light leaves from A toward B at “A-
time” tA, is reflected from B toward A at “B-time” tB, and arrives back at “A-time” tA’.
The two clocks are synchronous by definition if tB – tA = tA’ – tB ” (Einstein 1905, 142). 
Einstein asks us to imagine a rod in motion in relation to a reference frame where
the  clocks  were  previously  synchronized,  and  with  clocks  located  at  the  two ends.
Importantly one supposes that these clocks are also synchronous with the clocks of the
reference frame without taking into account that they are in relative motion: “the two
ends (A and B) of the rod are equipped with clocks that are synchronous with the clocks
of the system at rest, i.e., whose readings always correspond to the “time of the system
at  rest”  at  the  locations  they  happen  to  occupy”  (Einstein  1905,  144-5).  Now  we
suppose that next to these clocks (that give the time reading of the reference frame in
relation to which the rod is in motion), are two observers that “apply to the two clocks
the [previously mentioned] criterion for synchronism” (Einstein 1905, 145). From the
perspective of the observers, the time it takes light to go from A to B is given by tB – tA
= rab/(v – c), where rab is the length of the ‘moving’ rod as measured in the reference
frame (Einstein 1905, 144-5). This time interval is different from the time it takes the
light to go back from B to A: tA’ – tB = rab/(v + c).3 From this Einstein concludes that
the  observers  co-moving  with the  moving  rod would  thus  find that  the  two
clocks do not run synchronously while the observers in the system at rest would
declare them synchronous.
Thus we see that we must not ascribe absolute meaning to the concept of
simultaneity;  instead,  two events  that  are  simultaneous  when observed from
some particular  coordinate  system can no longer be considered simultaneous
when observed from a system that is moving relative to that system.  (Einstein
1905, 145)
This is an immensely important statement. Einstein presents for the first time the idea of
relativity of simultaneity by concluding that the synchronization procedure is frame-
3 I think Eddington’s related presentation is clearer than Einstein’s (Eddington 1923, 28). Let us consider
two reference frames S and S’ in relative motion (with velocity v; i.e., in which S’ is moving with a
relative velocity v in the positive x-direction of the reference frame S) that have their clocks synchronized
according to Einstein’s prescription. Let A and B be two clocks from reference frame S’. A signal is
emitted from A at time t1’, arriving at B at time tB’, being reflected back an arriving at A at time t2’. Since
the clocks where synchronized, the instant tB’ at B is simultaneous with the instant ½ (t1’ + t2’) at A.
However things look different from the perspective of S. For S the two clocks are moving; in this way,
for S, the time the signal takes in going from A to B is x/(c – v), where x is the distance between A and B
as measured in S, while the time it takes the signal to return to A from B is x/(c – v). Since x/(c – v) =
β2x/c2 (c + v) and x/ (c – v) = β2x/c2 (c – v), to S the instant of arrival tB at B is β2xv/c2 later than the half-
way instant ½ (t1 + t2), which is the time of arrival at B according to S’ as measured by S (i.e. βtB’). We
see  that  to  S  the  clocks  A  and  B  are  not  synchronized.  Taking  into  account  the  so-called  length
contraction we see that the desynchronization factor of B when seen from S is given by βx’v/c2, where x’
is the distance between A and B as measured in S’. If we consider that the two reference frames S and S’
had set their time to zero at the moment the origin of the reference frames coincided and that A is located
at the origin of S’, then tB =βtB’ – βvxB’/c2, where xB’ is the location of the clock B in the reference frame
S’.  This means that  a  clock C located further  away from the origin of  S’at  xC’  > xB’  will  from the
perspective of S be even more desynchronised than B in relation to the clock located at the origin of S’
(see also López-Ramos 2008). 
dependent,  i.e.  that  the  synchronization  procedure  is  relative  to  the  reference  frame
where it is applied. Clocks taken to be synchronous in one reference frame are taken to
be  desynchronised  from  the  perspective  of  another  reference  frame.4 The
synchronization procedure is not absolute; it is relative to the reference frame where it is
made. This is what the relativity of simultaneity is all about. All of Einstein’s comments
regarding  the  ‘relativity  of  time’  or  the  ‘relativity  of  simultaneity’  are  made  in  the
context  of  defining  physical  time  in  each  reference  frame  by  a  frame-dependent
synchronization procedure.
In the next section by analysing again Petkov example we will see what a different
does it make this clarification. 
4 Why the relativity of simultaneity can be in agreement with presentist views.
Let us look again at figure 2, now thinking in terms of a relativity of synchronization.
All the clocks are spatially located, one in relation to another, and this independently of
being in relative motion or relative rest. The clocks C1 and C2 at rest in relation to A are
synchronized with A according to Einstein’s prescription. The clock B passing by A is
not in the past of A or in the future of A; it is co-existent with A. As Einstein showed,
the procedure that synchronizes C1 and C2 to A, enabling to define the physical time in
this reference frame, is not for B a synchronization; this is due to the fact that for B the
clocks have a phase lag given by a desynchronization factor –βvx/c2, where x is the
clock’s position in A’s reference frame. 
In  this  way,  when  clock  C1 is  synchronized  to  A’s  clock,  there  is  for  B  a
desynchronization factor that must be taken into account (in this case of + 3 seconds),
and the same occurs in relation to clock C2 (that has a phase lag, for B, of – 3 seconds).
What follows is that A considers that C1 and C2 are in synchrony with A’s clock, and
because of this takes them to mark simultaneous events (i.e. the ticking of the different
clocks are considered to be in phase). However, B (that takes the ticking of the clocks of
B’s reference frame to be in phase, i.e. simultaneous) considers that the ticking of all of
the clocks in A’s reference frame go at the same rate but that there is an increasing
constant phase lag from a clock to another as one is further away from A’ clock (i.e. that
the clocks run at the same pace but where set at different ‘initial’ times by a ‘wrong’
synchronization procedure; e.g. A’s clock was set at 12h, A2’s clock set at 11h 45min,
A3’s clock set at 11h 30 min, and so on). Thus, for B, events that are simultaneous with
the ticking of the clocks in A’s reference frame  are seen to correspond to different
instants of time due to the lack of synchronization of A’s clocks from B’s perspective . It
is clear from this that B is not ‘seeing’ clock C1 3 seconds in the future or ‘seeing’ clock
C2 3 seconds in the past. The synchronization between clocks does not send the clocks
into  the  past  or  into  the  future;  B  is  simply  measuring,  due  to  the  fact  that  the
synchronization procedure adopted by A is relative to A’s reference frame, a phase lag
in the clocks synchronized in A’s reference frame. 
In this way, Petkov is wrong when considering that “for B clock C1 exists at the 8th
second of its proper time (at its ‘now’) and clock C2 exists at the 2th second of its proper
time (at its ‘now’)” (Petkov 2009, 129). This means that all of his argumentation relying
in an eternalist interpretation of the relativity of simultaneity cannot be made to stand.
4 Unfortunately this result is not usually recognized, leading to a lot of confusion in the interpretation of
the so-called relativity of simultaneity. One exception in a standard textbook is Bergmann (1942) that
writes: “observed from the unstarred frame of reference, different S*-clocks go at the same rate, but with
a phase constant depending on their position … two events that occur simultaneously with respect to S
are not in general simultaneous with respect to S*, and vive versa” (Bergmann 1942, 38 [my emphasis]).
In  fact  by clarifying  the  physical  meaning  of  the  relativity  of  simultaneity  as  a
relativity (frame-dependence) of the synchronization of distant clocks it turns out that,
contrary to conventional wisdom, presentism seems not to be at odds with the relativity
of simultaneity.
If we return to Einstein’s definition of physical time for different reference frames,
all that we have are clocks spatially located one in relation to another (at relative rest or
motion), i.e. clocks that co-exist spatially. We only deal with what Petkov called the 3D
world. 
When applying the synchronization procedure in different reference frames, we find
out  that  the  procedure  (or  any  equivalent  procedure;  see  Eddington  2009,  27-9)  is
frame-dependent (i.e. relative). This relativity of the synchronization of distant clocks
was ‘baptized’ by Einstein with the name ‘relativity of simultaneity’,  but it does not
mean that suddenly, just because B’s clock is in relative motion in relation to A’s clock
(and C1 and C2), A’s clock is co-existent with B’s clock while clocks C1 and C2 slip into
the future and the past.
As we have seen the only thing that happens is that B assigns different phases to C1
and C2, and this can be done because C1 and C2 co-exist with B (i.e. they share the same
now). In fact B measures the time light takes to go from A to each of the clocks, i.e. C1
and C2 are in the ‘midst’ of B’s reference frame so that B can observe them and attribute
to them a particular phase. Nowhere the notion of past and future enter the picture. We
only have spatially co-existent clocks. In fact this spatially co-existence of all the clocks
of all the reference frames can be called ‘now’ or ‘present’. Presentism seems to be very
much  at  home  with  the  so-called  relativity  of  simultaneity  (or  better,  relativity  of
synchronization).
5 Conclusion
If one endorsers a scientifically informed philosophy of time, it turns out, contrary to
conventional  wisdom,  that  presentism  does  not  have  to  be  seen  at  odds  with  the
relativity  of  simultaneity.  This  is  made  possible  by  clarifying  what  relativity  of
simultaneity  is  all  about.  The  relativity  of  simultaneity  arises  from  the  frame-
dependence of the synchronization of distant clocks. This means that clocks that are
synchronized in one reference frame S are taken to be desynchronised in a reference
frame S’ in relative motion in relation to S. All this is going on between spatially co-
existent clocks; if we take this spatial co-existence of distant clocks to be the definition
of ‘now’ or ‘present’, there is no need to rely on the notions of ‘past’ or ‘future’ to give
an account of the relativity of synchronization of distant clocks.  In this way presentism
can be regarded as a well-founded philosophical position informed by the relativity of
simultaneity.
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